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54TH CONGRESS, } HOUSE OP REPRESENTA'lTVES. 
2d Session. { 
REPORT 
No. 2548. 
REORGANIZATION OF THE LINE OF THE ARMY. 
JANUARY 19, 1897.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state 
of the Union and ordered to be printed. · 
Mr. HULL, from the Committee on Military Affairs, submitted the 
following 
REPORT. 
[To accompany H. R. 5835.] 
The Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the bill 
(H. R. 5835) to reorganize the line of the Army, etc., having consid-
ered the same, recommend that the bill do pass with the following 
amendments: 
On page 2, section 6, line 3, strike out "six" and insert "seven," 
and on page 3, section 8, line 2, strike out "six" and insert "seven." 
The . Report of the Secretary of War for 1883 calls the attention of 
Congress to the needs of the Army in the following language: 
The report of the General of the .AI-my bas a special interest in being the last 
annual report that General Sherman will make. At his own request he has been 
relieved from the command of the Army, preparatory to his retirement from active 
service under the act of 1882. He has, therefore, thought it best to refrain from 
making any new recommendations in his report, leaving that duty to his successor 
in t he command of the Army, Lieutenant-General Sheridan. He, however, calls 
attent ion to, and renews a former recommendation that a new organization be 
adopted for the regiments of infantry so that each shall be composed of twelve com-
panies, making three battalions of four companies each. And tha,'t the National 
Guard and volunteers of the States would soon follow suit, and we should have 
throughout t he country these small, handy battalions of four companies instead of 
the large cumbersome regiments of ten companies, a bad tactical unit and in prac-
tice always scattered. 
The Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the year 1884 says: 
The Lieutenant-General renews the recommendation of General Sherman that there 
should be m~de a._uniform organization of the three arms of the ser.vice by adding 
two compames with the corresponding majors to each regiment of infantry and 
concurs in the recommendation of the Lieutenant-General. ' 
Report of Secretary of War for the year 1885 Rays: 
~e Lieutenant -Gene~al commends_ to ca~eful co_n~i~eration the policy of concen-
trating troops and puttm g large garri sons m the vicm1ty of large cities as a measure 
of ec?nomy, ~he present railroad fac ilities. being ample to, transport them to the 
fron_tier speedily wJien needed, an~ also a~am recommends the addition of two com-
panies and _t wo ~a-Jors to each regiment of infantry, and thus making the three arms 
of the service umform. In both these recommendations I concur. 
In the report of the Secretary of War for the year 1889 it is stated 
that-
Th;e Major-General Commanding recommends the reorganization of the artillery, 
making seven regiments instead of :five and dropping the additional first lieutenants, 
the extra subaltern officers being, in his judgment, no longer necessary. 
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The Secretary, continuing, further states: 
I fully concur in his recommendations, and deem it very important that authority 
for these new regiments should be granted. In view of the diminished requirement 
for the use of the Army against the Indians, it may seem at first as if no additional 
force is required; but even in times of the most perfect apparent security the strength 
of the Army should bear some proportion to the population of the country. 
From our great increase of population the relative strength of the Army is rapidly 
diminishing. In 1870, with an enlisted strength of not quite 10,000 larger than now, 
the ratio of enlisted men to population was one-eleventh of 1 per cent, or 1 man out 
of 1,105; in 1880, with the enlisted strength 1,000 less than it is now1 one-twenti th 
of 1 per cent; at the present time, with a population of 65,000,000, 1t is thirty-nine 
one thousandths, or less than one twenty-fifth of 1 per cent, being 1 man for every 
2,569 of population. The authorized strength of the Army is now 30,000, but only 
25,000 is appropriated for. On the full basis of 30,000 its relative strength to popu-
lat ion would still be considerably less than in 1880, and one-half what it was in 
1870. The organization of these two. regiments is required by the change in situ-
ation as a larger proportion of the force is needed for seacoast defense, and it should 
be made, if in no other way, by the reorganization of two regiments from the other 
arms of the service. But this is not called for, would not be the best policy, and I 
trust will not be considered. 
Nearly every warlike power has adopted the three-battalion formation for infantry. 
Persia, China, and the United States are almost alone in adhering to the ingl -
battalion system. The requirements of our ser vice have been such as to give scant 
opportunity for the study and trial of new ideas. During our civil war only th 
present exigency could be considered ; at q_ther times our little Army has beens at-
tered in small detachments over our vast domain. The conditions are now changed; 
the larger part of the Army can soou be at regimental, or at least, battalion po ts. 
The necessit,y for this formation in the infantry is even greater than in the cavalry 
and artillery, where it has long been the rule. The reason for the change, alway 
~trong, has now, in view of the greater deployment necessary because of the 
improvement iu small arms, become imperative. 
Twelve years ago the report to Congress of officers sent to investi~ate the armi 
of E urope and Asia and to suggest what changes should be made m onr .Army to 
modernize and perfect it strongly urged the adoption of this system. General 
rant, herman, and heridan have recommended it, and it is favored by the lea.ding 
officers in our present service. From a military standpoint the question doe not 
seem to require evidonce or argument, but merely examination and action . With 
~bis.change and the elimination of the extra first li eutenants of artillery, the organ-
1zat1on of the three arms of the service will be, as it should be, uniform and upon one 
harmonious basis. 
The Secretary's report for 1890 ays: 
As a_military question there is no difference of opinion as to the advisability and 
ne e 1ty_ of the three-battalion formation for infantry. Every European power h 
adopted 1_t, a he leading gen ral of our country-including Grant, herman, 
and ' commended it. ow that our small Army can be stationed in 
1a1' tions of s rvic ar fully suited to its use. It already prevail 
~ be rvice, and there are even stronger reasons for it in th 
1 nght to be uniform. If we were ever met by a militar 
• 
o adopt it, and without proper preparation. 
ict the ationa.l Guard and college and 
t of or anization which is recognized and 
w adopt a higher standard of military organ-
ff rs to it as a model. Our Army i impl 
, on which to build in ca e of necessity, and a cor-
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The single-battalion organization of infantry ts radically defective and unfit for 
actual service under present conditions. During the period since the civil war om.· 
infantry organization has remained unchanged, and is now, in respect to the single-_ 
battalion feature, obsolete. It is so vicious that the first step, in case of war, 
· must be to abolish it and to start anew. It can not be amended or modified; it is 
unwieldy, incapable of subdivision to either make or meet attack under methods 
now prevailing, and the situation grows worse with every improvement of arms. 
'rhe development of range, rapidity, and accuracy of fire of modern arms bas been so 
great that a smaller and more flexible battalion is essentia], for this development 
makes celerity in handling troops on the field a prime necessity. 
The adoption of the three-battalion, system has been repeatedly urged by all our 
distinguished generals, and General Sherman considered it of such commanding 
importance that he made it the only subject of recommendation in bis last report 
as General of the Army. . 
But important as it was at that time, it is a necessity now, for under the new tac-
tics reqnired by the increase in range and rapidity of fire a ten-company battalion 
can not be maneuvered. 
The Secretary of War's report for 1892 says: 
Since the present organjzation of our infantry was adopted many changes have 
taken place in the art of war, resulting, among other things, in a material modifica-
tion of the form of infantry re~iments. Our stationary condition in this respect has 
left us with an obsolete orgamzation, the defects of which, however, have been so 
exhanstive]y discussed in former reports from this Department that they are only 
referred to in the present instance as a means of urgently renewing the recommen-
dations of nearly all my predecessors in behalf of three-battalion infantry regiments 
The Secretary of War's report for 1894 says: 
I earnestly 1·ecommend that Congress enact the legislation necessary to establish 
in the Army the battalion formation, now adopted by the armies of every other civ-
ilized nation. As necessary to effect that change, I recommend the removal of the 
limit of 25,000 men fixed by the act of June 18, 1874, and a return to the limit fixed 
by the act of Jnly 15, 1870. Legislative approval of these two propositions will 
restore to the effective force about 4,000 enlisted men, bringing the actual strength 
of the Army up to the nominal strength now fixed by law. 
The organization of the line of the Army has undergone no material change since 
the close of the civil war. During this period of thirty years every large foreign 
army has been completely reorganized. Changes an<l. improvements in arms, ammu-
nition, and equipments have forced upon the leading strategists and tacticians of 
the great armies of the world the necessity of a broad departure from the old 
systems. All have adopted the battalion as the tactical unit for infantry and artil-
lery serving as infantry, and nearly all the equivalent of the squadron as the cavalry 
unit. The light-artillery battalion has a similar composition. Should our Army 
ever be brought into collision with disciplined foreign troops our present formation 
would prove so defective as to turn the scale against us in a conflict on terms other-
wise equal. 
I· or some years the Secretaries of War, the Generals Commanding the Armv, and 
the most eminent authorities in military science in this country have urged the 
adoption of the battalion formation, and our most progressive and best-informed 
officers believe that the organization of our small Army should embody this u1:1iver-
sally approved result of modern military thought. 
Four companies are as large a body as is now possible for one officer to lead and 
control in action. Formerly, and down to a recent date, the colonel could see and 
dire t the mov.ements of all the men of bis regimen~ :who marched and fought in 
double rank with touch of elbows. Under such cond1t10ns a reo·iment of 1 000 men 
occupied a front on the battle line no greater than would now b; covered by a smail 
battalfon of one-third that number. A few years ago small-arms fire was ineffective 
at distances greater that 600 or 800 yards, while now it will be deadly at ranges of 
2,000 yards, or at even greater distances. · 
~n modern '!arfare th~ me~ wil~ act in small groups or singly, and the advance 
will be made m successive Imes m open order. Perfect organjzation and perfect 
control by the commander of each unit will be absolutely essential to efficiency and 
success in the field. 
The National Guard of several of the States, more progressive than the General 
Government, already has the three-battalion organization, and our own Army is 
being instructed as tho~ough!y a~ our defec~ive system will permit, battalions of 
from two to five companies bemg improvised m the differe1:t garrisons. 
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The Secretary's report for 1895 practically repeats in the , ame lan-
guage his recommendations in 1894. 
In the Secretary's report for 1896 he again recommends action to 
correct the defects of regimental organization that have been pointed 
out in previous years, and further states that--
The completion of several defensive works and installation of their modern arma-
ment at points where no troops are stationed, and the approaching completion of 
other modern batteries, suggest the pressing need of a larger force of artilleri 
than is now available. The present approved plans of sea-coast defen e involve the 
establishment of upward of 100 distinct batteries, groupeu in twenty or more 
harbors. In each must be a garrison of sufficient strength to take care of all the 
guns and other public property in the harbor, and the maintenance of all iu a state 
of efficient defense. Some addition to the present force of artillery will therefore 
be indispensably necessary. 
The following statement from the Senate report (No. 231) of t~ 
first session of the Fifty-second Congress so strongly present the w1 
dom of this country adopting the three-battalion organization for the 
infantry that it is here introduced: 
Of the necessity, under modern conditions of arms, of the three-battalion rgan-
ization for infantry there can be no question. Every civili:;,;e<l nation bas ::ulop~ l 
it, and every military authority insists upon it. \Var attempted to bo wao·pd with 
the single-battalion formation would be national , uicicle. . 
The cavalry and artillery arms now have the formation. How mnch mor 1111por-
tant it is that the infantry should be aided toward that condition which alone an 
insure success to our arms. 
A. leading officer of the British Army says: 
"In armies, infantry undoubtedly takes the lead, and to it!! action that of th 
other arms must be subordinated. It is the mainstay and backbone of all, wh ther 
it be reviewed in the light of numbers or its action upon the fiel<l of battle. I~ ~re 
is more deadly than that of artillery · its action is snre, while that of cavalry 1 ht• 
fol; upon it the brunt of the battle t'all ; it suffers more in action, ancl mo~·e on th 
line of march, and on its tactics the whole superst,ructure of military operation mu t 
be built." 
And yet while the other arms of the service have been materially aided toward 
P rfection. of organization during the last tw nty year , the infantry br_an ~ b 
been per~:mtt d to ta.nd still, and to-day is as far behind in ta tical orgamzat10n a 
th?ugh _it was armed witl_t the flint-lock musket, canying the b_nc~-and-ball c~r-
tndge, m t ad of ~he prmgfield bree •bloader with its deadly mi sile. It r t 1? 
th n-c mp:l'ny mgl -ba~talion organization that eem. to have been_ ad pte~l in 
1 21, an h1ch would bnng death, def at and disast r to our arm m an. h ld 
el? ~a m n up~m hicb we would enter, m ting, as we would, the chang d on-
di 1 n of t1 and armament of armie framed upon modern and a.pprov d 
m th d. 
In oa 
b r mu k 
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'rank 600 yards. Every r egimental command~r of our late. war will app:r:eciate ~he 
difficulty of commanding even this length of Jme. In ~he dm of battle ne~ther v:oJCe 
nor bugle note can easily be heard. The noise of conflict has been greatly mtens1fi.ed 
by the introduction of the breech-loading repeating :firearm. 
I Von Scherff, the great German military writer, referri~g to the Franco-Prussian 
war, says: "It was very difficult for officers to keep their men tog~fher, because of 
the noise of a close conflict between breecbloader and breechloader. 
Let the single line be leno-thened by intervals between the files, as it must now 
be and how powerless would any colonel be to control and command his regiment. 
H~ absolutely needs the three-battalion formation with a subordinate commander, 
a major, for each battalion. He can not even personally comruaud one and ~uper-
vise the action of the others, for with the battalions properly placed accordmg to 
modern tactics, each in rear of the other, the first with its skirmish_ers and support-
in o- lines and columns holding a front of 200 yards and a depth of 400, the second 
and third battalions in column, with spaces of about 250 yards intervening; with a 
total depth (owing to the far penetrating power of the modern arm) of about 1,000 
yards, being about the depth of a division prepared for battle as it was ~ormed in 
the three-line brigade organization during our war, the colonel commandmg could 
not only not be heard, but in most cases he could not see his command. ~he 
lieutenant-colonel, as the title implies, is needed as the lieutenant or general assist-
ant of the colonel, a.nd the majors commanding battalions become an absolute neces-
sity for successful warfa,re. 
To sum up the tactical matter, the old line-of-battle formation used during our 
civil war "now belon<rs to the past as completely as the Macedonian phalanx, and 
the general who would use it would simply invite the murder of his army and sacri-
fice the cau e of his country on the alte1· of imbeci1e conservatism." The present 
organization is objectionable in that it has no expansive power and must be totally 
changed in time of war, thus violating a familiar military maxim that "the plan of 
an army should be the same in time of peace as in time of war." 
This has caused the abandonm_en t by foreign powers of the "system" in vogue hefe 
which it is the object of this bill to reorganize. 
Among the first and most important recommendations in the report to Congress 
made by the military commission sent abroad from this country, published in 1877, 
is the chauge of system contemplated by this bill. 
A. paragraph from that report (Upton's Armies of Asia and Europe) shows the 
organization of the infantry branch of the service abroad: 
"The infantry of the German Empire consists, in time of peace, of one hundred 
and forty-eight regiments of three battalions each (p. 192). 
"The influence of the Franco-Prussian war in producing modification in military 
organization is nowhere more perceptible than in the French infantry. Four com-
panies were substituted for six in the composition of a battalion, and a regiment 
was ordered to be made of four battalions. Since that time the three-battalion 
organization has been ~dopted by France (p. 226). 
"In Russia tbe regiments of the three divisions of the guard and the six divisions 
of the army of the< aucasus have four battalions of four companies each. All other 
regiments have three battalions o_f :five companies each (p. 149). 
"The A.ustriau infantry is organized into regiments composed of five field battal-
ions of four companies each and one depot battalion of five companies. In case of 
war the six battalions are organized into two regiments of three battalions each, the 
fifth company of the depot battalion remaining as a common depot for both regi-
ments (p. 162). 
"In Italy a battal~on consists_ of four companies and a regiment of three battalions· 
and a. depot. The nflemen regmients are composed of four battalions each (p.102). 
"How c?m~let 1y_ the ~rmy of Japan bas been Europeanized may be inferred from 
the orgamzat1on of the mfantry. .A. regiment consists of three battalions of four 
companies each" (p. 9). 
The _infantrr regiments. of England are composed of eight companies, forming two 
~attahons of four compames each. Even this organization so much better than ours 
1~ severely condemned by _he: own military cri~ics, notably' by the most eminent Gen: 
Sir Lumley Gralrnm, who 111s1sts that the Prussian three-battalion formation is much 
better. General p~on condemns it i1_1 ~he following_ terme: 
The adherence of England to a military-system mherited from the last century 
can only be explained by her insular position and the security from invasion afforded 
by a powerful navy. * . *. * Should England _assail any of her formidable neigh-
bors, w~ m~y safely anticipate that the war will be followed either by a speedy 
reorgamzat1on of her army or by the total abandonment of the policy of armed 
intervention in foreign affairsn (pp. 268,269). 
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The infantry organization of but two nations conforms to ours. The e are China 
and Persia, whose armies are laughed at by the world. 
The ablest soldiers of the Republic have recommended this change in the strong-
est language, amounting at times to a supplication. General Grant desired it. 
Generals Sherman, Sheridan, and Schofield have earnestly urged it. 
As long ago as in .1869 General Sherman, then in command, suggested a change in 
our "system," which received the approval of the Secretary of War. 
In 1874-75 General Sherman said: 
"Inasmuch as the Regular Army will naturally form the standard of organization 
for any increase or for new r egiments of v olunteers, it becomes important to study 
this subject in the light of past experience and to select that form which is he. t _for 
peace as well as war. A cavalry r egiment is now composed of twel ve compani , 
usually divided into six squadrons of two companies eacb, or better, subdivided into 
three battalions of four companies each. This is an excellent form, easily admitting 
of subdivision as wen as union into larger masses. 
* 
"The ten-company organization is awkward in practice, and I am satisfiecl that 
the infantry regiment should have the same identical organization as exists for the 
?avalry and artil~ery, namely, twelve companies, so as to be S?sceptible of d~vision 
rnto three battalions of four companies each. These compames should habitually 
be about 100 men strong, giving 1,200 to a regiment, which in practice would ettle 
down to about 1,000 men. 'l'hree such regiments would compo~e a briga~e, three 
brigades a division, and three divisions a corps. Then by allowmg to an rnfantry 
corps a brigade of cava1ry and six batteries of field artillery, we would have an effi-
cient corps <l'armee of 30,000 men whose organization would be simple and mo t 
efficieut, and whose strength should never be allowed to fall below 25,000 meu." 
The following extract from a memorandum prepare~ ~t the _ar 
Department and placed before the House Committee on Military Affair 
further sustains the proposition that a reorganization of troop. in to 
small battalions for tactical purposes is indispensable to the Affic1 ncy 
of the Army, and explains generally the provisions of the accompany-
ing bill: 
The a~gu~ent from a military standpoint in favor of a subdivision of t~e regi-
mental hue mto ma.lier tactical units under the command of field officer 1s very 
briefly stated as follows : 
All who h_ave participated in a. modern battle, and all students of military science 
agr e,. that m order to push home an attack against an enemy who use a weapou t~at 
can kill at 2,500 yards, successive lines or waves to fill the losses of the leadrn ' 
troops are.nee_ sa.ry, a well as the distribution of the attacking front into group 
de}_)l yed m line , so that advantage can be taken of every foot of the ground that 
off r cover and protection. eces arily this greatly increases the difficulty of the 
co_utrol of a_b en and their proper leading into hot fight, when all are arm~d 
w1th r P at1 h-loaders, this owing to the. distribution and great increa m 
e covered by the enemie ' fire which bas to be pa d over. 
· e m v ment of hi whole regiment of 1,000 men 
t all times. ow a small battalion mu t 
by a whole regiment formed a ordin 
the strengt,h of the unit hou1d b 
h, ndle in the tres of the modem 
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Memo1'a1tdum to accompany a draft of a bill for the 1·eo1·ganization of the line of the .Arm!J. 
There has never been a time in the history of our country when any considerable 
portion of the population desired or necessities demanded a large standing army~ an 
institution obnoxious to the spirit of our people; neither has there ever been a time 
when the need of a small regularly organized force bas not been found esslmtial to 
the public welfare and its numbers have varied from a minimum of a few hundred 
men at the close of the last century, to an authorized maximum of about 75,000 men 
in 1866. From 1870 to 1874 its legal strength was 30,000; in 187?\ it was reduced to 
25 000 and it has remained at this strength to the present time. This force is organ-
iz~d· i~to 40 regiments, 1 separate battalion, and various detachments required for 
staff duties. 'l'he numbers of the Hospital Corps is variable, depending upon the 
needs of the service. It is now 711. -
The organization and the distributi<Jn of the troops to the several arms on Janu-
ary 1 last, was : 
Total 
enlisted. 
Cavalry •.•••••.•••••••••.••••... - - - - . - • -... - .... --....... - -... - - - - •. • - - - - • 6, 252 
Artillery .....••••....•••..•.•................ -. - - -- --.. -- . - - - - - '-- - - - - . - - - - • 4-, 025 
1nft~~irr~ ~"i :i~gi~~~~;: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 13' ~~g 
Ordnance detachments ............. -..... -- ... - -- - . --- - .. -- - -- - ..... - -- - - - . 485 
West Point detachments ....................... - -- - -- - - - . -- -- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 
Indian scouts .............•.................. - - -. - . -- - - -- -- - - -... - - -.. - - . - • 62 
Signal corps ..........••..•............................... -............ - - . . 50 
Ordnance sergeants........................................................ 110 
Commissary sergeants ..•.•............................. -.. - - . - ....... . - - . . . 90 
Post quartermaster sergeants ......... .... ............................... -.. -. 80 
Hospital Corps............. . • • • • . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 711 
Total ....•••••••••••.•....•..•..•....................•••.. : • • • . . • • • • . 25, 710 
The cavalry force-is 10 regiments of 12 troops each, only 10 of which are manne!1, 
giving an aggregate of about 625 men per regiw ent, or about 60 men per troop rn 
service. Twenty troops exist only on a skeleton basis. 
The artillery is 5 regiments of 12 batteries each~ 2 of which are equipped and serve 
as fielcl artillery. The remaining 10 batteries per regiment, or 50 in a.11, are in charge 
of the seacoast defenses. Each artillery regiment numbers about 800 men. The 
light batteries have 75 and the foot 65 men each. 
The infantry is 25 regiments of 10 companies each. The regiment numbers 525 
men and the company 65, but 50 of these companies exist only on a skeleton basis. 
Were all the companies and troops manned that are now authorized by law the 
numerical strength of each would of necessity be much less than now. The mean 
for all organizations now in service is 65 men each, but to man the skeleton compa-
nies on same basis would require quite 4,000 additional soldiers. 
A.s respects distribution of this force, the equivalent of 1 regiment of ca,valry, 4 
of artillery, and 8 of infantry are stationed east of the Mississippi. The remainder-
that is to say, 9 regiments of cavalry, 1 of artillery, and 17 of infantry-are w,est of 
the Mississippi, including 6 of the 10 light batteries. 
The cavalry.-The plan of reorganization herewith submitted contemplates no 
~hange in the cavalry ar~ b~yond t~e manning of the skeleton troops and complet-
rng the squadron orgamzat10n, while the total number of troopers would remain 
unchanged. · 
The infantry.-This_arm must fu_rnish the mass of any army. The other arms are 
accessory and subordmate to the mfantry. Upon its tactics the whole superstruc-
tu_r~ _of military <;>perations must be built . . Nearly all of the National Guard and 
m.1ht1a are of this arm, and they have a right to expect to see in each regular 
infantry regiment a model for their guidance. 
By the reorganization 3:ct of 1866 the infantry force was fixed at 45 regiments, the 
cavalry at 10, and the artillery at 5. In 1869 the number of infantry reo-iments offi-
cers a~d ~ en, was reduced nearly one-half, and in 1874 and subsequently a fufther 
reduction m men brought_ the total down from over 28,000 in 1868 to less than 13,000. 
There ~a.a than an~ has smce been no reduction in t4e cavalry or artillery. 
1:}ie rnfantry regime~t as at pre~ent constituted, 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 
maJor, and 10 compames, . dates from the army-reorganization act of 1821. Since 
then the armament, formation, and system of evolntion of all modern armies has been 
changed-some of them many times. Our arms, equipments and systems of drill have 
kept pace with the world's progress in these regards, and we have done what was 
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possible to adapt the incongruous 10-company regiment to the modern requirement 
of smal1, compact battalions of 4 companies, but this result has been only partially 
attainable. 
The only change necessary to secure the regimental formation desired is the addi-
tion of 2 companies and remanning of the 2 that have been skeletonized, making 
12 per egiment in all, divided into 3 battalions, each with its own major to 
command. 
Should the infantry organization be completed as propo!!ed, the number of compa-
nies equipped would be increased by 100, making the total infantry force 75 b~ttal-
ions of 4 companies, or about 240 men each. In time of emergency deman1hng a 
speedy increase of the number of men, the battalion could be increased to 400 me~. 
The next expansion would involve the addition of a fourth battalion to each regt-
men t. Through these steps the number of infant r ymen could be doubled without 
changing the organization at all . • 
The artillery.-The reorganization of the present artillery force into7 regime~ts of 
12 batteries each will provide 84 batteries of artillery, an increase of 24-, of which 14 
may be :field batteries and 70 for coast defense: . 
In emergency the regular troops, with their organizations filled to the maximum, 
might have to form the first line of defense while the further resources of the coun-
try were being made available. In that case the infantry and cavalry regiments 
would form an army corps of about 40,000 men. Fourteen 6-gun batteries wou_ld 
provide 84 guns for this corps, or a proportion of about 2 guns per 1,000 men. While 
this proportion might be sufficient on certain theaters of war, it is the smallest that 
should be contemplated. 
The value of preparation in this respect will be evident to any student of the 
early operations of the civfl war. The lack of a navy on the part of the Confed-
erate States made serious attack upon the Federal seaports a thing not to be ~ppre-
hendec\, A large proportion of the artillery on seacoast service could therefore be 
mounted as field batteries, for which service both officers and men had been pre-
pared by training in time of peace. But it is a foregone conclusion that in anr war 
such as is now at all possible, our heavy batteries will be urgently needed m the 
seacoast fortifications. The above minimum proportion of field ~uns should there-
fore be provided as the nucleus for the volunteer batteries which must form the 
~reater portion of this arm in fane of war. A reasonable preparation in this ~esp~ct 
1s all the more neces ary in view of the greater time needed for the orgamzat1on 
and training of volunteer field artillery as compared with other arms. . 
. The proposed organization of the artillery will provide 70 foot batteries for service 
m ea oa t fortifications. The necessity for such a provi ion becomes more appar-
ent with eYery addition to the number of emplacements, guns, and carriages in the 
modern defenses. 
The problem is, on the one hand, to determine the minimum number of tra.i?e~ 
men nece sar kers" of costly mu,t rial in time of peace! a.nd the mm1-
~nm numb r war garrison ; on th other hand, to recon-
cil th e · · n of cost. 
\ ' ill require a total of 29,314 enli ted 
ortar . On th , peace footing the 
m n, every one of w horn would be 
now cont mplated by the R vi ed 
n; by a. further po sihle incr a 
· ween 17,000 and 
th ld or a.ni-
rovicl the war 
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12 and 15. Not all of these will require permanent garrisons in time of peace. The 
w~rk of instruction will be carried on in the larger fortifications, ~hile detach1!1en.ts 
ent out from time to time will suffice for the care and preservation of material m 
the others. It is believed that 70 companies of seacoast artillery will enable this 
work to be properly done, but that it is the minimum number that should be 
expected to do so . 
.Redistribution, 30,000 men.-This improvement could be accomplished through an 
addition to the present enlisted force of about 4,300 men, and will leava the total 
strength the same as that fixed by section 1115 of the Revised Statutes. The distri-
bution would then stand about as follows: 
Cavalry, 30 squadrons ..........•............... ··.···· .... ···-·· ........•... 
Artillery, 14 light batteries and 70 seacoast batteries ................ ···-·· .. 
Infantry, 75 battalions ....................................................• 
Engineers, 1 battalion ...................................................... . 
Ordnance detachments .......................................... ~ ......... . 
West Point detachments ................................................... . 
Indian scouts ............................................................. . 
Signal corps .............................................................. . 
Ordnance sergeants ................................ : ...................... . 
~~!1!1~~~t::r~:f::S~~~ ·. ~: ·.: ·_ ·.: ·.-. ·. ·. ·.: ·_:::::: -.-. : : ·_: ·.::::::: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 
















Total • • • • . • • . • • • • • • . . . . . • . . . • • • • . . . • • . . . . . . . . • . • . • . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . 30, 000 
Such a force, considered with reference to a territory of 3,000,000 square miles, 
provides 1 soldier to 100 square miles. 
Cost.-The additional expense involved amounts to about 6t per cent. of the 
present annual cost of the .Army, and the increase in the effective strength of the 
regiments will be quite 18 per cent. 
The effect of the proposed changes upon expenditures has been computed with a 
great deal of care. Every feature affecting cost has been considered, and the exhibit 
herewith gives a full and complete statement of the result. The ciude results ma,y 
be stated as follows (for c.letails see exhibit herewith): 
Increase for salaries of commiisioned officers .......•.....•.....••........ 
Increase for pay of enlisted men ..............•.......... : .............. . 
Increase for clothing of enlisted men ........••..................... ~ ... . 
Increase for subsistence of enlisted men ...•............................. 






Total increase over present expenditnre for pay, rations, clothing, 
andforage ...................••.................................. 1,770,073 
Conclusion.-Promotion is but an incidental feature, but this measure, if enacted, 
will remove inequalities in respect to promotion that have been the subject of well-
fonnded criticism. 
The organization will meet the present requirements and all that can be foreseen; 
it will place the .Army on a plane of efficiency never before reached, aucl will give, to 
many deservingofficers the promotion to which their age and long and efficient seryice 
entitle them. Promotions will be equalized in the three arms, and many just cauSfls 
of complaint will be removed, • 
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Proposed reorganization of the line of the Army. 
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!l 0 0 ..... ~ <I) 0 ~ 0 ~ <11 H 8 OH 0 rn 8 0 ~ rn 0 ~ ~ ---------1-1---------------- _ -----
Cavalry: 
Now ...••••••••••••. 10 10 80120140 120 480 100 50 100 500 400 200 800 100 4,520 6, 170 
Proposed ..•..••••••. 10 10 80 120 140 120 480 120 50 120 600 480 240 860 . . • . 4, 820 6, 170 
- -----------1---1---+--~--
Increase . • • • • • • • • . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 20 . . . . 20 100 80 40 60 . . • . . .. - -• • • • • • • 
Decrease . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 100 200 .•.••• 
51 
Artillery: a 
Now . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • . 5 5 15 60 180 65 280 60 25 60 260 240 120 . . . . 180 8, 140 4, 025 
Proposed ... . .••... : . 7 7 21 84 98 84 301 84 35 84 504 392 168 42 . . .. 8, 850 5, 075 
--1- -1---1---~-- - ----
Increase .-.. •• • • • • . 21 2 6 24 19 21 24 10 '.!4 244 152 48 42 . . .. 710 1, 050 
Decrease . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 82 . . . . . • • . . . . . • . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . • . . . . . . 180 .•.••.. -- - - -
2 3 . .. . Ea<:h 1. battery.... . . . . . . . 1 1 1 . . . . . . . . . . .. .. 1 











Now .. •••..•••••. ... 25 25 25 250
1
800 250 875 200 125 200 800 800 400 .. . . 600 10,20018, 125 
Proposed ...... ...... ~~~~ 850 800 1,075 800 125 300 1,2001, 200 ~ I.:..:.:.:..:..:.:.:. 12,900 16,325 
~;t:;:S~ :::::::::: ::\:: -~~ -~~ -~o 5~ ·--~~~ -~~~ ::::1-~~~ - -~~~ - - ~~~ --~~~1:::: ·iioo -~:'.~~ .~:~~ 
Eaehcompany ..... ·- \-- ···I 1 1 1...... .... .... 1 4 4 2 .... .... 48 54 
Total now •... ..... . ••.. 40 40 70 430 570 485 1 585 ~480 2001 86015601440 720 800 880 17,860 23, 320 
Total proposed ... . ... .. . ~ l~ l1261~ 1588 504 1'. 8061 504 2101 50412: 804_2: 072 1,008 402 .... 21, 070
1
27, 570 
~~~l~~~~:'s~·: ::::::::: .r -~~\.'.t~8 o~ ---~~~ .. :~ .. ~~1 -~~ .. :~~\- -~~~!- -~~~ -~~~·sso -~·-~~~ _4:~~ 
11 Promotions: 2_ lieutenant-colonels; 4 majors; 10 captains; 34 :first lieutenants; 2 second lieuten-
an . To be appomted: 21 second lieut nan ts. 
old~l~::1t~tl~~- 50 captain ; 10v first lieutenants; 150 second lieutenants. To be appointed: 200 BOO· 
c Includes 71 akeleton organizations. 
Beoroanization--Effect upon annual expense. 
FOR COMMI I ED OFFICERS. 
INCREA E . 
e. 
······--····--· -·- -·- -----···-····-·· -···--······ 
... ........ -... -. -............. -............ -.... ........ . 
. -. -.... -....... -... - .......... --.. -.. -. 












REORGANIZATION OF THE LINE OF THE ARMY. 11 
Total artillery ........•.•........... •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . • . . • • • • • • • • • • . $126, 200 
Total all arms ...•.....•••••................•.•.•.......•...•.••••• 
Total decrease ............••....•....•.••.....••..••....•••..••••.•••••. 
587,200 
58,320 
Net increase...................................................... 528,880 
Forage for mounted officers' horses, 2 regiments artillery, 44 horses, at $100.. 4,400 
Forage, etc., for 200 horses for new batteries, at $100. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. . . 20,000 
Total for enlisted men ..•••••..••....•.•.............•• ~ . . • • • • . • • • • • . . . . . 1, 216, 793 





6 first lieutenants, at$1,920 ......................................... . 
26 first lieutenants, at$1,800 .. ..................................... .. 
Total artillery ................................................... . 
FOR ENLISTED MEN. 
INCUEASE. 
Cavalry: 
20 first sergeants, at $300 ......... . ................................ .. 
100 sergeants, at $i16 ..••..•....................................••••• 
80 corporal1:1, at $180 .. .•. •••••................ . .............•....••.. 
40 musicians, at $156 ............................................... . 
60 farriers and saddlers, at $180 ..................................... . 
Total cavalry .•••••••••.•••••.•.........••••.•.••••••••..•••.•.••.. 
Artillery: 
10 regimental noncommissioned officers ............................ .. 
24 first sergeants, at $300 ..••... ... ........ . •....................•••• 
244 sergeants, at $216 .......•........................................ 
152 corporals, at $180 .............................................••. 
48 musicians, at $156 .........................................•.•.••. 
42 farriers and saddlers, at $180 .... ......•.................... _ ...•.. 
710 privates, at $156 ..•..........................•.••....••••••.. _ ... 
Total artillery ..••.......•.•...••......•...........•.•• _ ••• _ •• _ • •• 
Infantry: 
100 first sergeants, at $300 .......................... . ............... . 
400 sergeants, at $216 ............................................. __ . 
400 corporals, at $180 ............................................ ___ . 
200 musicians, at $156 .............................................. . 
2,700 privates, at $156 .............................................•. 
44 privates, staff, at $156 .... .... ..... ..... . .••.....•.••....•••••.•••• 
!~m ~!lt]f ~~-: : : ~:: ~ ~ ~: : ~: ~ : : : ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~:: : : : : : : : : : : ~ ~ ~ ~:: ~ : : : : : : : 
Total all arms ...................................... _ .. _ ... __ . _. _. 
Total decrea1:1e ............ ............••.•. __ ... _ .... ________ . _ . __ 
et increase ...........•....•........•.........................••• 
Clothing for 4,294 enlist d men, at $46.67 •.•.........•......... ____ .... __ 
































Total enlisted men ..•.••••••••••••••••••••.••..•••••.•••••••• _ •... 1, 216, 793 
H. Hep. 2-13 
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DECREASE. 
Ca.va.lry: 
100 wagoners, at $168 ...•.•••••...••••..••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••• 
200 privates, at $156 .............. --~- ••.••••.••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Total cavalry ..•••..••........••.•••..••••..••••••••••••..•••••••• 
Artillery: 
120 artificers, at $180 ............................................... . 
60 wagoners, at $168 .... ·_ ........................................... . 
Total artillery ..••........•..........••.........••••••••..••..•••• 
Infantry: 
400 artificers, at $180 ............................................... . 
200 wagoners, at $168 ... ; .................•.......•...•...•.•••.•••• 
Tota.I infantry ................................................... . 
:f;~t:l ~~~~l~;.::: ·.:::: : : : : : -. : : : ~ ~ ~ : ~: ~ : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 
Tota.I decrease ••••••••••.•.............•••.••••••••••••••••••••••• 
0 
$16,800 
31,200 
48,000 
==== 
21,600 
10,080 
31,680 
==== 
72,000 
33,600 
105,600 
31,680 
48,000 
185,~ 
